Turkey between NATO and Russia: the failed balance: Turkey's S-400 purchase and implications for Turkish relations with NATO by Yegin, Mehmet
www.ssoar.info
Turkey between NATO and Russia: the failed
balance: Turkey's S-400 purchase and implications
for Turkish relations with NATO
Yegin, Mehmet
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Yegin, M. (2019). Turkey between NATO and Russia: the failed balance: Turkey's S-400 purchase and implications for
Turkish relations with NATO. (SWP Comment, 30/2019). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C30
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63534-8
  
 
NO. 30 JUNE 2019 Introduction 
Turkey between NATO and Russia: 
The Failed Balance 
Turkey’s S-400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO 
Mehmet Yegin 
Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense missile system has raised questions 
concerning Turkey’s alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the country’s future intentions. Nonetheless, a break with NATO is unlikely, as 
alliance dependence is still applicable for both Turkey and other members. Turkish 
government circles have cast the recent purchase as a means to gain more autonomy 
from and/or better bargaining power with Western allies. However, the purchase 
of S-400s will not bring about the desired outcomes. Instead, it will generate a dual 
dependency characterized by vulnerability to Russia and an increased need for 
assurances from NATO. Turkey also seems to have reached the limits of its bargaining 
power, as the United States is placing more weight on punitive measures. The only 
explanation left for the purchase is the possibility that President Tayyip Erdoğan may 
be seeking a domestic rally effect via a confrontation with the United States to pre-
vent possible challengers to his leadership from gaining momentum. 
 
Russia is scheduled to deliver S-400s to Tur-
key in July 2019. Turkey and the United 
States are engaged in a high-level debate 
concerning the ramifications of the deal on 
the NATO alliance. Chairmen and ranking 
members of both the Armed Services and 
Foreign Relations committees of the US 
Senate delivered a bipartisan message via 
op-ed to assert their objection to Turkey’s 
acquisition of both a Russian S-400 missile 
system and American F-35 advanced fighter 
aircraft, as well as to state their determina-
tion to activate sanctions against Ankara if 
Russia delivers the missiles. In response, the 
Turkish minister of defense voiced Turkey’s 
disagreement over the severity of risks of 
using S-400s and F-35s together and added 
that the US sanctions should target its 
enemies rather than an ally such as Tur-
key. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs 
also reiterated that the S-400 issue is a 
“done deal” and may not be annulled. 
Another confrontation took place between 
US Vice-President Mike Pence and his 
Turkish counterpart, Fuat Oktay. The two 
accused each other of risking the alliance 
via developing an affinity with each other’s 
adversaries, Russia and the Syrian Kurd-
ish YPG (People’s Protection Units), respec-
tively. 
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This tension between the governments 
has refueled the debate on “Turkey break-
ing up with NATO.” Indeed, analysts and 
journalists in the United States have been 
questioning Turkey’s ties with the alliance 
for a long time. 
Alliance Dependence Prevails 
The question is whether these confronta-
tions are a prelude to the end of Turkey’s 
NATO membership. Alliances are sustained 
not with perfect policy harmony, but in-
stead are based on alliance dependence 
among the parties. Unless alliance depend-
ence ceases, the tensions between Turkey 
and other NATO members serve to advance 
inter-alliance bargaining and do not neces-
sarily signify alliance termination. Thus, a 
break between Turkey and NATO would be 
the extreme of all possible outcomes of the 
S-400s imbroglio. 
Alliance endurance is determined by 
alliance dependence, which is based on 
indispensable security benefits. Thus, other 
than the termination of the need for these 
indispensable security benefits or the exist-
ence of a better alternative, a divergence in 
policy preferences among allies – even a 
major divergence – may not be a sufficient 
reason to end an alliance. Every strongly 
worded statements in the media made by 
high-level officials or diplomatic confronta-
tions do not necessarily signal the end of an 
alliance. Media and analysts tend to over-
estimate the severity of crises in alliances 
without clear criteria for defining them. 
In terms of alliance dependence, Turkey 
would not put the peace and deterrence pro-
vided by NATO at risk in a volatile neigh-
borhood. This approach includes Russia-
originated threats. Despite conjunctural 
cooperation between Turkey and Russia, 
the chances for a new strategic axis cen-
tered on the two countries is improbable. 
Rather, NATO is an important asset for Tur-
key, even in developing its relations with 
Russia, as membership eases the threat of 
domination by Moscow. As a NATO mem-
ber, Turkey can rely on deterrence that 
discourages regional adversaries from en-
gaging in a full-scale military campaign 
against Turkey. This deterrence is no less 
important than having particular weapons, 
such as S-400s. NATO also supports inter-
alliance peace between Turkey and Greece, 
thereby sustaining a delicate balance to 
prevent the Aegean dispute from turning 
into a military confrontation. Turkey has 
a long-term policy of participating in the 
international organizations that Greece 
joins in order to maintain parity. Leaving 
the most crucial one – NATO – would put 
Turkey in the difficult position of confront-
ing the alliance alone. Lastly, Turkey would 
not want to give up the NATO nuclear um-
brella, given that some of its neighbors pos-
sess (Russia) or are striving for the capabil-
ity of developing (Iran) nuclear weapons. 
From NATO’s perspective, Turkey’s de-
parture from the alliance and the possibil-
ity of Ankara becoming an adversary would 
be a significant setback. A Turkey that acts 
in unison with Russia in the Black Sea and 
the Mediterranean would be strategically 
disadvantageous for NATO. Besides, in addi-
tion to the ethnic and religious background 
of Turkey’s population, it has a broad geo-
graphic reach that could not be replaced 
by another NATO ally. As a country with a 
Muslim-majority population, Turkey pro-
vides political legitimacy to NATO missions 
in Muslim countries, as seen in Afghanistan 
and Libya. Turkey still contributes to the 
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and 
NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. 
S-400s for Autonomy and 
Domestic Concerns 
In Turkey, government circles primarily cite 
political reasons in justifying the purchase of 
S-400 air defense missiles from Russia when 
they could have purchased alternatives from 
NATO members. All the arguments share 
three intersections: having closer relations 
with Russia, thereby making Turkey more 
autonomous vis-à-vis NATO; using this as a 
bargaining chip; and/or making the pur-
chase for domestic purposes. 
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Government circles point at US reluc-
tance to supply necessary high-tech weap-
ons to Turkey (e.g., US Congress restrictions) 
and to the strict control over their use and 
transfer of technology. Bringing in Russia as 
an alternative supplier breaks the Western 
monopoly over arms sales and enables Tur-
key to negotiate a better deal with reluctant 
allies. 
Domestic concerns related to foreign 
policy are also voiced by analysts close to 
the government. NATO allies are regarded 
as unreliable due to their perceived support 
of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt that tar-
geted President Erdoğan, whereas Russia 
swiftly declared its support for Erdoğan. 
Thus, Russia is expected to back Erdoğan in 
the case of another coup attempt and, more 
importantly, S-400s would be a useful in-
strument in protecting Erdoğan from a 
domestic attack, particularly from the air 
forces. Besides, confrontation with the West 
delivers a rallying effect for President Erdo-
ğan and provides an excuse for economic 
downturn in domestic politics. Seeking 
more autonomy in the international arena 
and making sovereign decisions concerning 
weapon purchases unite people behind Erdo-
ğan. This is especially true during a time in 
which nationalism is on rise in Turkey. 
Not More Autonomy but 
“Dual Dependency” 
The purchase that was intended to bring 
more autonomy to Turkey could paradoxi-
cally lead to a “dual dependence” on both 
Russia and NATO, defined by a vulnerabil-
ity vis-à-vis Russia and an increasing need 
for assurances from NATO. This would be 
the exact opposite of the intended outcome. 
Turkey–Russia relations are currently 
fragile and transactional. After a Turkish 
Air Force fighter jet shot down a Russian 
Su-24 aircraft violating Turkish airspace 
near the Syria–Turkey border in November 
2015, trust became a casualty of their bi-
lateral relations. Even after Turkey apolo-
gized, contentious and confrontational de-
velopments in bilateral relations continued. 
Russia did not reverse all sanctions after the 
apology, as a reminder of their displeasure. 
Moscow, furthermore, did not reinstate 
visa-free travel for Turkish citizens and still 
upholds some punitive measures, such as 
blocking the import of some Turkish agri-
cultural goods. On this shaky ground, Tur-
key may not be able to maximize its inter-
ests through its relations with Russia. 
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s is not 
the right path to pursue the intended out-
come of strategic autonomy. It is wrong to 
believe that when Turkey receives the 
S-400s it will simultaneously receive total 
control over them. These weapons are not 
like Bolshevik rifles used in Turkey’s Inde-
pendence War after World War One. As a 
sophisticated weapon system, the producer 
reserves the possibility to meddle with and 
hinder the use of the system. In practice, 
the use of this system will be open to Rus-
sian influence and manipulation. 
Turkey is solely focused on US concerns 
about the risk of Russian radars spying on 
F-35 aircraft. However, Russia may manipu-
late the weapon system in a manner that is 
counter to Turkey’s intentions. The weapon 
system may stop providing security in a 
time of dire need or target aircraft without 
Ankara’s authorization. Turkey may need 
further assurances from NATO to avoid vul-
nerabilities and limit possibly hostile Rus-
sian actions. Worse, the presence of S-400s 
on Turkish soil would make NATO assis-
tance costlier. 
Limited Space for Negotiation 
with the United States 
The Turkish administration expected 
to make a grand bargain with President 
Donald Trump when he was elected into 
office; however, the prospects of using 
S-400s as a bargaining chip to bring about 
meaningful results are limited. Turkish 
government circles expected that – given 
his business background – President 
Trump would be open to negotiations con-
cerning the following disputes inherited 
from the Obama administration: the YPG’s 
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role in Syria, Fethullah Gülen’s presence 
in the United States, and the violation of 
Iran sanctions by Turkish banker Mehmet 
Hakan Attila. S-400s could be an important 
bargaining chip to reach concessions on 
these three major disagreements, especially 
considering the strong reactions of the 
United States to Turkey’s previous deal 
attempt for Chinese missiles. 
From Trump’s inauguration to the pres-
ent, however, the United States has shown 
itself ready to levy punitive measures in 
negotiations with Turkey. In October 2017, 
the United States suspended the issuance 
of visas to Turkish citizens due to a dispute 
over the incarceration of US diplomatic 
personnel in Turkey. As the fragility of 
Turkey’s economy has become more appar-
ent, the United States has relied on more 
severe measures. 
As a reaction to the incarceration of 
American pastor Andrew Brunson in Tur-
key, the United States applied individual 
sanctions to two Turkish cabinet members 
and doubled tariffs on steel and aluminum 
imports from Turkey. At present, the two 
countries seem to be running toward an 
even more damaging confrontation over 
the S-400s. 
The punitive measures that the United 
States announced in response to Turkey’s 
S-400 deal are unprecedented in post–Cold 
War bilateral relations. The United States 
has not only threatened Turkey with the 
introduction of CAATSA (Countering Ameri-
ca’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) 
sanctions, which aim to halt Russian de-
fense sales, but also to terminate Turkey’s 
participation in the F-35 advanced fighter 
aircraft program. The former brings con-
siderable risks to Turkey’s already fragile 
economy, whereas the latter not only 
deprives Turkey of F-35s, it would also be 
detrimental to Turkish defense firms. Addi-
tionally, the Eastern Mediterranean Security 
and Energy Partnership Act, a piece of bi-
partisan legislation, was introduced and 
advanced in the US Congress. This act would 
extensively favor the Greek side within the 
Turkey–Greece balance in the Mediter-
ranean, as it suggests lifting the arms em-
bargo on Cyprus and deepening security 
cooperation with Greece. 
Domestic Concerns May 
Encourage Risky Moves 
Results of recent local elections and the 
rerun of the Istanbul mayoral elections 
have turned attention to domestic politics 
in Turkey. Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor-
elect in Istanbul, has emerged as a national 
political figure and is now regarded as a 
possible alternative to President Erdoğan. 
Additionally, intra-party opposition within 
the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has become more apparent with the 
emergence of other potential challengers 
such as Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu. 
President Erdoğan may risk the detrimental 
effects of US sanctions to create a rallying 
effect and thereby attempt to prevent pos-
sible adversaries from gaining momentum. 
Unless there is a sudden change in 
Turkey’s position, the negotiations seem 
likely to move forward on the delivery of 
the S-400s in July by Russia and the imple-
mentation of sanctions by the United 
States. The latter may create a path depend-
ency for Turkey, which may become more 
reliant on the Russian defense industry. 
Having no access to NATO’s supply of cru-
cial weapons, Turkey may be forced to buy 
more Russian-produced arms. Currently, 
there are also debates in Turkey about buy-
ing Russian Su-35s or Su-57s in case of the 
cancellation of F-35 deliveries. 
US sanctions will not only affect Tur-
key’s economy negatively but also provide 
a scapegoat (United States and NATO) for 
the Turkish economic crisis. Such a situa-
tion may cause an irreparable rise in anti-
Western sentiment among the Turkish 
people. Public opposition in Turkey may 
bring limitations to future collaboration – 
even those based on mutual interest – 
between Ankara and other NATO allies. 
Dr Mehmet Yegin is a Visiting Fellow in the Americas Division at SWP. 
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